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ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred By Reversing The Magistrate’s Ruling On The Motion To
Suppress Because The Facts Supported The Magistrate’s Conclusion That
There Was Reasonable Suspicion To Believe King Was Driving Under The
Influence And Because There Was Reasonable Suspicion That She Was Driving
Inattentively
A.

Introduction
The magistrate applied the totality of the circumstances test and

concluded that King’s driving pattern of passing through “at least two”
intersections with her turn signal on without turning provided reasonable
suspicion that she was driving under the influence. (Tr., p. 20, L. 20 – p. 22,
L. 7.) The district court reversed, holding that “driving patterns that are merely
unusual or irregular but not illegal do not justify a suspicion to support a traffic
stop” for DUI and that driving through multiple intersections with a turn signal on
did not constitute reasonable suspicion of inattentive driving. (R., pp. 76-81.)
The district court erred because application of the correct legal standards to the
facts supports reasonable suspicion of both DUI and inattentive driving.
(Appellant’s brief, pp. 4-11.)

B.

The District Court Applied An Erroneous Legal Standard When It
Required Suspicion Of An Illegality In Addition To DUI To Conduct A
Traffic Stop
Traffic stops “are permissible when justified by an officer’s reasonable

articulable suspicion that a person has committed, or is about to commit, a
crime.” State v. Neal, 159 Idaho 439, 442, 362 P.3d 514, 517 (2015). “Thus
there are two possible justifications for a traffic stop—the officer has reasonable
suspicion that a driver has committed an offense, such as a traffic offense, or the
1

officer has reasonable suspicion of other criminal activity, such as driving under
the influence.” Id.
Reasonable suspicion of DUI is present if the officer “was in possession of
facts giving rise to a reasonable and articulable suspicion that the vehicle’s driver
was intoxicated.” State v. Atkinson, 128 Idaho 559, 561, 916 P.2d 1284, 1286
(Ct. App. 1996). “In determining whether a reasonable suspicion existed at the
time of the stop, the proper inquiry is to look at the totality of the circumstances
and ask whether the facts available to the officers at the time of the stop gave
rise to a reasonable suspicion, not probable cause to believe, that criminal
activity may be afoot.” State v. Dice, 126 Idaho 595, 599, 887 P.2d 1102, 1106
(Ct. App. 1994) (internal quotes and citations omitted). “Reasonable suspicion
requires less than probable cause but more than speculation or instinct on the
part of the officer.” State v. Horton, 150 Idaho 300, 302, 246 P.3d 673, 675
(Ct. App. 2010) (citation omitted). Moreover, an officer may rely on his training
and experiences to draw inferences that might elude an untrained person.
United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 418 (1981); State v. Roe, 140 Idaho 176,
180, 90 P.3d 926, 930 (Ct. App. 2004). The inference that King may be under
the influence of alcohol, drawn by Sergeant Lathrop with his training and 16
years of experience from the circumstances underlying this traffic stop, including
the time and King’s driving pattern, was reasonable.
On appeal King claims Sergeant Lathrop lacked reasonable suspicion of
DUI because her driving “‘can be described as normal driving behavior.’”
(Appellant’s brief, pp. 5-7 (citing State v. Emory, 119 Idaho 661, 664, 809 P.2d
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522, 525 (Ct. App. 1991)). 1 The flaw in this argument is that King’s driving
behavior cannot be accurately described as normal, much less so normal that an
officer with Sergeant Lathrop’s experience could not, under the totality of the
circumstances, reasonably suspect she may have been driving under the
influence. At a minimum King was confused, distracted or inattentive, and
suspicion that alcohol may have been the reason for any of those things was
reasonable. King’s contention that there might be an innocent explanation for
her driving (Appellant’s brief, p. 9 (driving through multiple intersections with the
turn signal activated “can just as easily be explained as the driver not knowing
which street to turn onto”) neither renders her driving “normal” nor negates
reasonable suspicion. United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 277 (2002) (“A
determination that reasonable suspicion exists, however, need not rule out the
possibility of innocent conduct.”); State v. Rader, 135 Idaho 273, 276, 16 P.3d
949, 952 (Ct. App. 2000) (“the existence of alternative innocent explanations of
the circumstances does not negate the fact that the officer had a reasonable
suspicion that a crime might have been committed”).
The district court’s holding that “driving patterns that are merely unusual or
irregular but not illegal do not justify a suspicion to support a traffic stop” applied
an erroneous legal standard. (R., p. 76.) King’s claim that signaling a turn three

1

King argues that the “normal driving behavior” standard was applied by the
district court. (Appellant’s brief, pp. 7-9.) The district court specifically held that
“driving patterns that are merely unusual or irregular but not illegal do not justify
a suspicion to support a traffic stop.” (R., p. 76 (emphasis added).) King’s
contention that the district court did not require an illegal driving pattern is
contrary to the plain language employed by the district court.
3

or more blocks in advance is a “normal driving behavior” (Appellant’s brief, pp. 512) is meritless. The magistrate applied the correct legal standard and reached
the correct result that the totality of the circumstances gave rise to suspicion that
King may have been driving under the influence at the time of the traffic stop.
The district court therefore erred in reversing.

C.

The District Court Also Erred When It Concluded That Sergeant Lathrop
Lacked Reasonable Suspicion Of Inattentive Driving
Sergeant Lathrop had reasonable suspicion that King was driving

inattentively when she drove through at least two intersections with her turn
signal on but without turning. (Appellant’s brief, pp. 8-11 (citing I.C. § 49-101(3);
I.C.J.I. 1031; Deen v. State, 131 Idaho 435, 435, 958 P.2d 592, 592 (1998)).
The district court erred in holding otherwise.
On appeal King argues that an officer does not have reasonable suspicion
of inattentive driving, apparently as a matter of law, until he observes a motorist
go through three intersections with an active turn signal but not turning.
(Appellant’s brief, pp. 15-16.) In this case Sergeant Lathrop testified he saw
King drive through three intersections. (Tr., p. 6, Ls. 11-21.) The magistrate
found she had driven through “at least two” intersections (Tr., p. 20, L. 20 –
p. 21, L. 19), which does not exclude three. Even if King were correct, and there
is a bright line rule requiring three intersections, the magistrate’s factual findings
do not exclude three intersections so, at best, King would be entitled to a remand
to resolve an outstanding factual question. King’s argument does not show the
district court correctly reversed the order denying suppression.

4

King next argues that seeing her eventually turn dissipated reasonable
suspicion because it shows she meant to signal her turn more than two blocks
ahead, rather than being inattentive. (Appellant’s brief, pp. 16-17 (evidence she
turned “shows that the signal was simply early in time”).) This argument fails,
first because King again makes the erroneous argument that an innocent
explanation of the evidence necessarily negates reasonable suspicion and,
second, because intentionally driving multiple blocks with a blinking turn signal is
not even a truly innocent explanation. That she eventually made a turn did not
dissipate the officer’s reasonable suspicion that she drove inattentively prior to
making the turn.

2

The district court erroneously concluded Sergeant Lathrop

lacked reasonable suspicion that King was driving inattentively.

2

King also argues that the stop violated her rights under the Idaho Constitution.
(Appellant’s brief, pp. 17-18.) King did not claim in the magistrate division that
the Idaho Constitution granted greater rights against search and seizure than the
Fourth Amendment. (R., pp. 17-22; Tr., p. 15, L. 17 – p. 18, L. 10.) Even if this
argument were preserved, King has presented no reason why reasonable
suspicion of DUI or inattentive driving would be inadequate to justify a traffic stop
under the Idaho Constitution. State v. Schaffer, 133 Idaho 126, 130, 982 P.2d
961, 965 (Ct. App. 1999) (Court will not interpret state constitution differently
from corresponding provisions of federal constitution unless given a “cogent
reason”).
5

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court to reverse the district court and
reinstate the judgment of the magistrate.
DATED this 17th day of November, 2016.

/s/ Kenneth K. Jorgensen_________
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
Deputy Attorney General
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